Northwest Europe seaborne jet/kero imports had recovered to 500kbd in early October (on a 28-day moving average basis) up from 350kbd on September 20. However, seaborne exports and inventories data suggest this relief may be temporary. The 28-day MA of global seaborne exports pointing to NWE stands at a mere 250kbd as of October 6, a 55% decline y-o-y and 45% lower m-o-m.
LHS: Northwest Europe seaborne jet/kero imports (bd, 28-day moving average); RHS: Pacific Basin jet/kero exports pointing to Northwest Europe (bd, 28-day moving average)
This decline is notably driven by a decline in Northeast Asia’s jet/kero exports to NWE, standing at a seasonal low of 30kbd as of Oct 6 (28-day MA). The decline is only set to intensify as Japan’s kerosene demand picks up for heating in the winter (taking more South Korean barrels) notably with jet and kerosene supply lower than usual (inventories down 17% y-o-y in August and production down 6% y-o-y, according to METI data), while rapidly declining onshore crude inventories (-2.2mbd in Sep) in the region also further threaten transport fuel supply to Europe.
In addition, China issued a third batch of export quotas for clean products (totalling ~36mb), but at volumes 54% lower than the corresponding batch in 2025. An important share of these quotas is allocated for bonded jet fuel tanks that are used to refuel international flights, and hence will not translate into seaborne exports.
In addition, less jet/kero has been flowing through the Strait of Hormuz, with the last cargo carrying jet having transited on Sep 12 (as of Oct 5). The 14-day moving average of jet/kero loaded west of Hormuz is at 140kbd as of Oct 5, down from 420kbd a month earlier. The lower loadings and increased time to reach outside markets, due to most oil barrels being transferred via STS after exiting the Strait, make it unlikely that significantly more jet fuel from the Middle East will reach Northwest Europe soon in the current security environment.
An important supplier for Europe has been the US Gulf Coast, whose jet exports to NWE have been at seasonal records since the beginning of the war, supplying 130kbd in Aug and 60kbd in Sep. However, jet inventories in PADD 3 have declined by 1.4mb w-o-w (as of Oct 2, according to EIA) and now stand under the 5Y seasonal average after being up y-o-y (and often at 5Y seasonal highs) since late-March (EIA). Jet production in PADD 3 is still at a seasonal high but closer to 2025 levels than it had been since the beginning of the war, while PADD 1 jet production is also relatively low, consistently below the 5Y seasonal average since mid-2026 (EIA).
The combination of lower inventories and lower production (compared to previous months) could lead to lower exports out of PADD 3 to Northwest Europe, as more US jet fuel remains domestic.
LHS: PADD 3 jet fuel inventories (mb, EIA data); RHS: PADD 3 jet fuel production (mb, EIA data)
Meanwhile demand appears to remain strong across the US and Northwest Europe. The 14-day moving average of TSA passenger volumes (a proxy for jet fuel demand) is down 2.4% y-o-y as of October 6 but still up 9.1% compared to the 2021-2025 average. In Europe, Eurocontrol data shows the 7-day MA of the number of flights in their network area is up 2.4% y-o-y as of Oct 6.
Diesel has been the hotter topic over the past few months, but tighter jet fundamentals and rising diesel supplies have been widening the regrade. Global diesel/gasoil exports in September have benefited from strong exports from China and the Middle East (via East of Hormuz STS, read more here). The last week of September marked the highest weekly global seaborne diesel exports since the Hormuz disruptions started, at 8.9mbd compared to average global exports of 7.5mbd between March and September 2026. However, with China exports suspended until further notice, the market is unlikely to see the same level of global diesel liftings in Q4.
And on a more regional scale, Europe as the tightest diesel market is still under strain (read more here). The G7 diesel release announced on 2 October is large on paper, but even an aggressive and best-case scenario for physical delivery would only make up some of the deficit (see LHS below). Cumulative seaborne diesel/gasoil arrivals into the EU market in early October 2026 were down just above 50mb y-o-y, and falling imports into Europe from outside regions is increasing this gap.
LHS: European Union cumulative seaborne diesel/gasoil arrivals and supply scenarios from G7 diesel release (mb); RHS: Europe seaborne diesel/gasoil imports from outside regions (bd, 28-day MA)
European middle distillates are faced with fragile supplies, low inventories and high prices into Q4. While temporary relief measures, especially for diesel, may ease the balance in the short term, the US and Northeast Asia are faced with uncertain policy measures and dwindling stocks across crude and products that are threatening supply recovery.
Source: www.vortexa.com
